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Summary 
The Andean countries, a region with abundance of natural 
resources and other valuable assets, exhibit a variety of governance 
problems that hinder its potential for social peace, stability and 
economic prosperity. Their empirical governance record, based on 
historical and recent data, although varies from country to country has 
been characterized by political instability, considerable frequency of 
constitutional reforms, presidential crisis, volatility of democratic 
institutions and violence. In turn, the empirical evidence on quality of 
institutions put the Andean region in a relatively modest place in 
international rankings of (survey–based) indices of voice and 
accountability, rule of law, regulatory burden, control of corruption, 
political instability and violence although improvements are also 
detected in some of these governance dimensions. Institutional reform, 
in a broad sense, is needed to ensure the basic conditions of economic 
development.  
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Introduction 
The Andean region of Latin America has experienced 
governance and economic difficulties that have compounded its 
structural problems of poverty, slow growth, inequality and financial 
volatility. Governance difficulties are reflected in a high turnover of 
authorities, low rankings in international indices of institutional 
effectiveness, recurrent political crisis, violence (particularly acute in 
Colombia) and potentially fragile democracies
1. All these governance 
problems put clear obstacles to steady economic growth besides 
affecting the quality of democracy.  
The last few years have been marked by considerable political 
instability in the Andean region. In April of 2002, for example, a 
failed  coup’d’état took place in which Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez was temporarily ousted of power only to regain the Presidency 
a day later in a confusing set of events that involved the military and 
some leaders of the main business association. More recently, in 
December of 2002, a national strike has virtually paralyzed the 
economy, including the oil sector, in an attempt to remove President 
Chávez. In Ecuador in January of 2000, the democratically elected 
President Jamil Mauhad was deposed by the military following an 
indigenous uprising in which a short lived military– indigenous junta 
took power for a few hours, only to eventually, under strong foreign 
pressure, turn power over to Vice President Gustavo Noboa. In 2000, 
Peru’s President Alberto Fujimori fled the country after a scandal of 
 
                                                       
1    The definition of “Andean Countries, AC” comprises Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela, which are the countries 
member of the Community of Andean Nations, CAN. Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
8 
corruption and political intimidation that involved his chief of security, Vladimiro Montesinos, 
stripped the Fujimori administration of all its remaining credibility. 
The economies of the Andean countries have been also affected by governance and 
instability problems. In the last ten years the average rate of economic growth for the five Andean 
countries
2 (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) was lower than the average growth 
rate in the Latin American region as a whole. Colombia has seen its historically stable economy 
give way to slow growth and financial vulnerability. Ecuador, in turn, suffered a severe economic 
and financial crisis in 1998–99 and has experienced recurrent currency depreciation and escalating 
inflation that was further complicated by a severe banking system crisis.
3 Ecuador’s answer to this 
instability was to radically change the currency regime and adopt the US dollar as its official 
currency in early 2000. Official dollarization, supportive fiscal and financial policies, and better 
external conditions helped Ecuador to, albeit gradually, restore domestic confidence, reduce 
inflation, and resume economic growth in the last two years; although external imbalances have 
developed in 2002. Output growth has also slowed in Peru during the political turbulence 
associated with the demise of the Fujimori regime. Venezuela has experienced a volatile growth 
record that followed the fluctuations in international oil prices. Venezuela’s domestic political 
polarization has, in turn, created significant uncertainty that has hindered private investment and 
output has declined substantially, in spite of favorable oil prices. Although its growth rate increased 
during the 1990s, Bolivia's economy has also been affected by the regional slow–down and by 
internal social unrest.  
This paper underscore the critical importance of governance conditions in affecting 
economic development. The purpose of this paper is to characterize political and constitutional 
regimes, the quality of institutions, social inequality, and ethnic diversity in the Andean region. To 
that end, a conceptual framework is developed (section 2) that distinguishes the specific roles of 
political regimes, constitutional rules, the quality of institutions, and patterns of social conflict in 
generating governance patterns that, in turn, affect economic outcomes. The focus of the paper is 
mainly on how to characterize and understand governance rather than on providing a detailed 
analysis of the channels through which governance conditions affect economic growth. This will be 
the subject of a next paper. The empirical analysis of the paper (section 3) combines long run 
evidence on the frequency of constitutional reform, presidential crisis, and political regimes of the 
Andean region in the twentieth century along with more recent indicators of governance and 
institutional quality in the 1990s and early 2000s prepared independently by the World Bank and 
the World Economic Forum–Harvard University. Indicators of social inequality, ethnic diversity, 
and economic performance for each of the five Andean countries are also provided in this section. 
Section 4 gives an interpretation of the governance and economic record of the Andean region 
countries and section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
                                                       
2   By "Andean Countries" we refer to the countries that are currently members of the CAN (Andean community of nations). 
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I.  Political regimes, institutions 
and social conflict: a conceptual 
framework 
The conceptual framework adopted in this paper sees 
governance conditions as the result of the interaction of three sets of 
variables: 
A. The nature and stability of the political regime and the 
constitution. 
B.  The quality of state institutions. 
C.  The pattern of social conflict and cooperation related to 
inequality and ethnic diversity. 
The political regime and constitutional rules constitute the 
highest echelon in the hierarchy of institutions
4. The judiciary, the 
regulatory bodies, the ministries, the budgetary process are part of the 
second level in the hierarchy of institutions. This paper identifies 
complex agent–principal problems, rent seeking, corruption, and 
violence as important factors that weaken state institutions and create 
serious governance problems. The third set of variables goes beyond 
formal institutions and focuses on patterns of social behavior such as 
cooperation and conflict, largely related to inequality of income and 
wealth and to ethnic diversity. This framework highlights the impact 
of each of these three sets of variables (and the effects of their 
interaction) on the governance and economic performance of the 
Andean countries.  
                                                       
4   See Tommasi (2002) for a discussion of the concept of “hierarchy of institutions”.  Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
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A.  Political regimes and constitutions 
Constitutional theory has a long history coming back to Montesquieu (1748), Hamilton and 
the Founding Fathers of the U.S. constitution, Hayek (1960), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), with 
more recent treatments given by Cooter (2000) and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2002). 
The public choice school or contractarian approach
5 championed by Nobel prize James 
Buchanan focuses on a social contract, such as the constitution, that defines the overall political 
framework under which society evolves. Buchanan (1988) distinguishes between the process of 
writing up a constitution–setting up the basic rules of the game in society–and the specific policy–
making process that unfolds under the rules established by that constitution. In the words of game 
theory, the constitution is the first stage establishing the rules of the game: the second stage is 
playing the game. A normative analysis would enter in the first stage (writing the constitution and 
creating the basic institutions). The positive analysis, in turn, would focus on playing the game
6. 
Under ideal conditions, constitutions are assumed to have been written under the “veil of 
ignorance” regarding initial resources and interests and that the writers of the constitution did not 
end up in a better or worse position in society as a result. This assumption has been criticized as 
unrealistic because the framers of constitutions do often consider their own interests in the process 
of writing the constitution
7. 
An important tradition in political theory focuses on the design of the main political 
institutions of the state. This institutional design includes electoral rules, division of powers, and 
checks and balances among different branches of the state. The constitution is the main legal chart 
that establishes the basic rights and responsibilities of individuals and the workings of the political 
system. The major types of democracies are the parliamentary and presidential systems with semi–
presidential regimes (e.g. France) that mix elements of both systems. In presidential systems (e.g. 
like in the United States), presidents are elected either by a direct vote or by an electoral college, 
have fixed terms in office, and often have legislative initiative. In fact, Presidents are often 
endowed with considerable powers to present legislation to congress and to administer the 
executive branch of government and cannot be removed from office before the expiration of their 
official term, except in cases of impeachment or resignation Presidential regimes do not require 
legislative majorities. In contrast, in parliamentary regimes, heads of government or prime–
ministers are elected by parliament. They can be removed through a vote of non–confidence in 
cases of political crisis and the head of government (i.e. the Prime Minister) needs a parliamentary 
majority to sustain its government. 
Basic criteria with which to compare presidential and parliamentary systems include how 
each system contributes to the continuity and stability of democracy and how the system forestalls 
“regime breakdowns”' in the event of a major political crisis. Authors such as Juan Linz and Arturo 
Valenzuela (1994) argue that the "dual legitimacy" between the president and parliaments, the 
alleged tendency towards a "winner–take–all" system in presidential regimes, the role of outsiders 
in bidding for the presidency, and the rigidity of terms make presidential regimes more prone to 
generate political crises than parliamentary regimes
8. From an economic viewpoint the choice of 
political regime and, even more importantly, its stability over time are important factors that affect 
the degree of political stability in a country, a variable that influences both investment and the rate 
of economic growth. 
                                                       
5   See Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Buchanan (1988). 
6   Dixit (1996) stresses that, in practice, the distinction between rule–making and actions is more a continuum rather than a discrete 
choice binary category. Specific policies can have long–run permanent effects comparable to the impacts of rule–making decisions. 
7   See Dixit 1999a). 
8    See Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) for alternative views on presidentialism and 
parliamentarianism. CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo  N°23  
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B.  Institutions of the state: strengths, weaknesses and factors 
that affect quality 
Once the basic political framework of a country has been defined by its constitution, 
there is a vast array of political and economic institutions (e.g. ministries, central banks, 
customs, public investment agencies, the judiciary) whose quality of performance is critical 
for ensuring appropriate governance and, ultimately, good economic outcomes. Positive 
political economy (PPE) applies economic principles of individualism, incentives, rationality, 
and constraints to the analysis of institutions and of their impact on economic performance.
9 
In this view, institutions are formed to reduce transaction costs both in the economic and 
political realms.
10 A political–economy approach that has gained considerable attention in 
recent years is the theory of transaction costs politics (TCP) developed by North (1990b) and 
Dixit, (1996, 2001a, 2001b). This approach evaluates how different political governance 
structures (constitutions, government agencies, laws) cope with ‘transactions costs”. In an 
analogy with transaction cost economics (TCE), transaction cost politics uses the contract as a 
unit of analysis. While in economics a contract is a verifiable process (e.g. renting a house or 
lending to a firm), in politics contracts are more complex. The definition of a “political 
contract” is often ambiguous: a president or senator may be elected with a platform that is 
vague, making it difficult to monitor the fulfillment of the initial promises. Besides, there are 
incentives to change policies along the way dismissing initial commitments (e.g. the 
phenomena known as "time inconsistency").
11These agency problems are further complicated 
by the existence of several principals (the general public, voters, specific interest groups); 
these multiple principals lead agents (the government, parliament, public agencies) to face 
several mandates that are often inconsistent. The enforcement of “political contracts” is 
difficult because the institutional mechanisms of enforcement (elections, the supreme court, 
referendums) can not be activated at every small deviation from initial commitments. In 
recognition of all these difficulties, modern political economy theories have devised new 
concepts such as reputation, commitments, rules, and delegation (using independent central 
banks, for example, to conduct non–inflationary monetary policy). This literature sees these 
institutional mechanisms as a way to cope with incentives for non–compliance by agents that 
face incentives to be inconsistent, conflicting mandates, and a system with limited 
accountability. These complex principal–agent problems make the need for appropriate 
institutions that can deal with governance problems clear.  
Rent–seeking, corruption and violence as factors that weaken institutions 
Under ideal conditions, institutions and organizations must have clear goals, be properly 
funded, have a sound financial and human resource base, and be free of undue political 
interference. At a “general equilibrium level” they must be part of an institutional architecture 
that is based on adequate governance principles that ensure a proper working of institutions 
for among other things, fostering economic prosperity. In the previous section we identified 
several reasons related to the agent–principal problems that are particularly serious in the case 
of political transactions for why institutions fail to function properly. Here we identify three 
phenomena that tend to weaken the institutions of the state. These three factors are: 
                                                       
9   See North (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.  
10   An alternative view of the origin of institutions is provided by Olsen (2000) who puts forward a theory of power and compulsory 
compliance to explain the origin of the state and institutions. In Olsen’s framework institutions are not necessarily created for 
efficiency reasons to reduce transactions costs but for purposes of redistributing resources towards those in power. In this vein 
institutions can be dysfunctional and consistent with bad social outcomes such as economic decline and recurrent crisis  
11   See Drazen (2000).  Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
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i) Rent–seeking behavior 
ii) Corruption 
iii) Violence 
Rent–seeking and corruption. 
The rent–seeking approach
12 in political economy sees society as formed by individuals 
organized in special interest groups (or acting alone) that are motivated by their particular interests 
rather than by the general interest of society. Common examples include: farmers seeking price 
support schemes, industrialists wanting import protection, bankers pressing for protective 
regulation and less competition from new intermediaries. From this perspective, the state is seen as 
institutional machinery that, among other things, dispenses economic favors and transfers income 
among groups in exchange for political support.  
Rent–seeking behavior leads some groups to attempt the capture of key state institutions 
such as customs, tax administration authorities, public contracts agencies, where they can extract 
rents. These rents can be obtained by lobbying (rent–seeking) or simply by illegally appropriating 
public assets for their personal benefit. In this later case we are referring to corruption. In some 
cases these groups may attempt to capture the whole state– apparatus and corruption becomes the 
norm for the predatory groups (e.g. the kleptocracy) that have captured the state. Corruption and 
the stealing of state–assets (like the “spontaneous privatization” in post–soviet Russia) tend to 
flourish in weak states where mechanisms that make government officials accountable to the 
public, parliament, and the courts work very poorly and curtail rule of law. Corruption and   
rent–seeking clearly undermine the strength of state institutions. More over, intense rent–seeking 
can lead to corruption. 
Violence 
In a world of voluntary exchange and compliance with the rule of law, there is no role for 
violence. Less so for internal armed conflict entailing different armed groups from the official 
army. An important feature of several contemporary societies
13 and relevant for some of the 
Andean countries, however, is pervasive violence and internal conflict that severely weaken the 
state and can lead to its collapse. In these cases, the state loses its monopoly on the use of force and 
rule of law becomes severely limited or simply non–existent. In the case of armed conflicts, it is 
interesting to analyze the different motivations of rebel groups. They may be a mix of political 
motives (rebellion as justice–seeking) and quasi–criminal motives (rebellion as crime).
14 The view 
of rebellion as driven by greed considerations emphasizes the quasi–criminal features of rebel 
organizations and the motivations that those organization have in common with criminal 
organizations.
15 The scale of rebellion and armed conflict is much larger than crime, even including 
organized crime.
16  
                                                       
12   See Krueger, 1974. 
13   Currently around 40 countries, included Colombia, are experiencing some sort of internal conflict, civil war, or significant rebellions 
within their own territories. 
14   Collier and Hoeffler, (2001), using data for 78 large civil conflicts between 1960 and 1999 find econometric evidence that the risk 
(probability) that a civil war will start during a five–year period is better explained by a set of determinants known as greed factors 
than by ‘grievance” factors. 
15   In general the determinants of crime are not the same determinants of rebellions and civil wars, although crime and rebellion often 
intertwine in complex ways. 
16   Empirically the literature identifies a civil war as a conflict involving at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, with deaths taking place 
in a context of violence between a government and an identifiable organized group; moreover, at least 5 % of the deaths must be on 
each side. In turn, while criminal organizations, gangs and mafias, typically range from around 20 to 500 members, rebel 
organizations have between 500 to 5,000 and more combatants. 
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The view of rebellion as “justice–seeking” emphasizes “grievance factors” such as income 
inequality, ethnic and religious divisions, and political motivations as the most important driving 
factors of the groups engaged in internal conflict. 
Rebel groups with a mix of both political and quasi–criminal motivatives consistently behave 
in a way oriented to weaken and even destroy the state, so as to pursue their goals more easily, and 
with impunity. It is interesting to note that in many cases, rebel organizations do not want victory 
against the government (i.e. the seizure of power). They are often interested in preserving a very 
weak state and profiting from that situation. In these conditions, an armed conflict becomes an 
“equilibrium” or at least a stable situation that can last for a long time (see Collier, 2000)
17. 
Interestingly, this model can be used to explain the long–duration of certain internal conflicts such 
as the one in Colombia. 
C.  Social cooperation and conflict, inequality, and ethnic 
fragmentation 
Beyond formal institutions, social cooperation and social conflict also play an important role 
in generating actual governance and economic outcomes. Individuals, groups, and social classes 
each have different economic interests and motivations. Society, in turn, is an arena in which 
conflict and cooperation coexist with a political system that mediates the various demands and 
claims from different social groups.
18 Social conflict can vary in nature: one type is distributive–
conflict, in which groups (or economic classes) fight over their shares of the national income.
19 In a 
situation of distributive conflict, inflation can be seen as the result of the conflict over real income 
in which each groups manage a price (wages, mark–ups, etc.), which combines with an 
accommodative monetary policy to generate inflation. Other points of distributive conflict are 
taxes, transfers, and spending, with low income groups pressing for higher taxation to finance 
social spending and income transfers. In contrast, the upper– middle class and the wealthy tend to 
favor lower taxation of income, financial assets, and productive wealth. In practice, conflict and 
cooperation alternate; the approval of tax and spending laws, for example –has different 
distributive implications and requires some degree of cooperation and consensus in parliament. 
The endogenous growth theory investigates the role of inequality in economic growth and 
finds that more unequal societies say countries with more income and wealth inequality among its 
members, tend to generate more social polarization and political conflict than more egalitarian 
societies. Thus economic growth, controlling for development levels, would be higher in more 
egalitarian societies than in unequal and polarized ones, as in the later the pressures for higher 
taxation tends to be higher and the quality of labor–capital relations tends lower than in the more 
egalitarian societies.
20Recent literature on the origins of institutions (Acemoglu, 2002) relates them 
to social, and distributive conflict, and argue that inefficient policies and institutions are functional 
to the interests of politicians and social groups holding power in detriment of society at large. In 
this view institutions can be socially inefficient. The only and overriding motivation to create 
                                                       
17   Rebel movements may have several sources of funding: i) criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion and ransom to raise 
revenues to finance their activities along with alliances or taxes on criminal organizations (e.g. it is found that guerrilla groups in 
Colombia derive an important part of their income from taxes to drug–cartels), ii) predation of natural resources that they control, 
iii) funding coming from foreign governments hostile to the adversaries of those rebel groups, iv) funding from diasporas (often 
living in developed economies) formed by nationals that left their home countries because of civil wars or extended conflict and 
send financial contributions to support rebel groups they identified for historical reasons with their exit. 
18   Marxian theory puts considerable emphasis on the conflicting nature of capitalist development , although its main channel is 
conflict between capital and labor. Other theories identify other actors and channels of social conflict that go beyond the simple 
capital–labor dichotomy. 
19   See Taylor, L (1991).  
20   See Solimano (1998). Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
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institutions is not to reduce transactions costs: they are often set–up and maintained to help keep 
power for certain groups and individuals. 
Another dimension of social differentiation that is especially relevant for Bolivia, Peru, and 
Ecuador is ethnic diversity. The question arises whether multi–ethnic societies have more 
difficulties in reaching consensus than ethnically homogeneous societies. Empirical studies of the 
impact of ethno–linguistic fractionalization on economic performance (growth) suggest different 
answers to this question. On one hand, authors such as Easterly and Levine (1997) attach a central 
role to ethno–linguistic fractionalization in explaining the poor growth performance of multi–ethnic 
Africa. In contrast, other analysts such as Collier (2001) find that ethnically differentiated societies 
do not necessarily have either worse economic performance or greater risk of civil conflict than 
more ethnically homogeneous societies. For Collier, the political regime and the degree of ethnic 
dominance are more important than simple ethnic–diversity in explaining growth performance in 
Africa. 
D.  Other factors affecting governance 
The previous set of variables affecting governance does not exhaust the factors that explain 
the type and quality of governance. A variable, emphasized by Max Weber for example is the 
quality of leadership. A forceful leader (e.g. President) can be important in steering a country in a 
certain direction and help it to avoid political conflict ensuring stability.
21 However, that leader can 
be also authoritarian therefore its behaviour could inconsistent with democracy. Moreover the 
economic ideas of the leader may be inconsistent with economic policies that bring prosperity.  
This discussion underscores the fact that the type of leader, his personality, ideas, political 
abilities, etc. can have an important influence in creating good or bad governance in a country. 
Other governance variables that can be important are ideology, the type of legal system, the degree 




                                                       
21   Conversely the formal leader can be weak, politically inept and unable to manage conflict. CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo  N°23  
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II. Empirical  analysis   
In this section, we empirically investigate the effects that 
political regimes, constitutional change, the quality of institutions, and 
social conflict have on governance and economics in the Andean 
countries.  
A.  Frequency of constitutional reforms, 
presidential crises and political regime 
changes 
We start our analysis of governance in the Andean Countries 
(AC) by looking first at the stability of the constitutional framework. 
To examine this, we investigate the frequency of major changes in the 
constitution that lead to the approval of a new constitution in each of 
the AC during the twentieth century (see table G1). This is an 
important indicator of the frequency of changes in the basic rules of 
the game in society and therefore a crucial indicator of instability in 
rule–making institutions. This is, certainly, a “low frequency” 
indicator of instability, but still of a great importance. The Andean 
country that has experienced the highest number of new constitutions 
in the period running from 1900 to 2000 is Venezuela with 8 
constitutions approved in that period (six out of those eight 
constitutions were approved between 1903 and 1953, table G2). It is 
followed by Ecuador with 7 constitutions (3 approved since 1967); 
Bolivia (5 constitutions), Peru (4 constitutions) and Colombia (just 
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one new constitution approved in 1991). Table G2 also shows the number of new twentieth century 
constitutions in the three countries that are often considered the most politically stable countries in 
Latin America: Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay. A similar computation is done for four OECD 
countries: the United States, Germany, Great Britain and Italy. All the Latin American countries 
analyzed, as well as The United States, have presidential regimes during the period of analysis. In 
contrast, Germany, The United Kingdom, and Italy have parliamentary regimes. 
The five Andean countries have an average of five new constitutions in the twentieth 
century, a high number when considered from an international perspective. In the same time period, 
the average number of new constitutions for Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay was 2.5.
22 In turn, the 
average number of constitutional reforms in The United States, The United Kingdom, Italy, and 
Germany, in the twentieth century was 0.8. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has 
had new constitutions approved in the last century. Germany, on the other hand, approved one new 
constitution in 1919 and then another in 1949, after world war I and II, respectively. 
Another measure of political instability is the frequency of Presidential crisis (turnover). By 
presidential crisis we refer to a situation in which a head of State (the President) does not complete 
his/her constitutional term for various reasons: forced removals by a coup d’état, resignation, etc. 
Table G1 provides the number of such presidential crises in the five Andean countries in the period 
1950–2002. 
The country with the highest number of presidential crises in this period is Bolivia, with 16 
crises between 1950 and 2002. Most of those crises (11) took place in the period 1969–1982. 
Clearly the 1970s (and surrounding years) were a period of high political instability for Bolivia. 
Another country with a high frequency of presidential crises is Ecuador, with 10 of such crises, 
mostly concentrated both in the 1970s and in the 1990s. In contrast, Colombia registered only two 
presidential crises in the last half century, both in the 1950s. Interestingly, Colombia displays a 
remarkable degree of democratic continuity (as demonstrated by low frequency of presidential 
crises) in spite of its internal armed conflicts. This is certainly a paradoxical situation 
The last column of table G1 shows the prevailing political regime (democratic, authoritarian) 
at the time of the presidential crises in each of the five Andean countries. There seems to be no 
clear correlation between the nature of the political regime and the frequency of presidential crises 
although the nature of the relationship varies across countries. In fact, in Bolivia, most of the 
presidential crises took place mostly in the 1970s within non–elected military regimes, in a pattern 
of generals–turned–presidents replacing other generals–turned–presidents. In contrast, Ecuador, the 
second highest frequency country in terms of presidential crises, had several presidential crises in 
democracy, mostly in the 1990s (i.e. Abdalah Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad were two presidents that 
were democratically elected and then ousted from office before the expiration of their 
constitutional mandates). Another important dimension of political regime is the distinction 
between presidential versus parliamentary regimes.
23 As mentioned before, Linz and Valenzuela 
(1994) have argued that presidential regimes are more prone to generate political crises and regime 
breakdowns than parliamentary systems. We have noted that the frequency of presidential crises 
has been very high in Ecuador and Bolivia, low to moderate in Peru and Venezuela, and low in 
Colombia.  
An interesting case of a country, outside the Latin American region, with high turnover of 
Prime–Ministers (a different concept to that of presidential crisis) is Italy, which has had 58 prime–
ministers in the last 52 years (on average more than one prime minister per year). The Italian case 
                                                       
22   Uruguay had the highest number of constitutional reform of the three most "stable" countries in Latin America. 
23   All the Andean countries have presidential regimes like most of Latin American and Caribbean countries. CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo  N°23  
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suggests the perplexing conclusion that an exceedingly high frequency of change in prime–
ministers can take place without constitutional and economic crisis in a parliamentary regime.  
In the Andean region, the degree of continuity of democracy (defined as an absence of 
constitutional breakdowns) in the last forty years has been much higher in Colombia and in 
Venezuela than in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In fact, while these countries had several military 
interventions in the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia and Venezuela have managed to avoid military 
regimes since the 1950s. This is not to say, however, that these two countries have had complete 
political stability in the years following their military regimes. In fact, Venezuela had a Presidential 
crisis with Carlos Andrés Perez in 1993 and a coup attempt against Chávez in 2002; this 
turbulence, however, has not led to a collapse of democracy (at least so far)
24. 
B.  Subjective indicators of quality of institutions and 
governance: the World Bank indices 
We will now turn to the empirical assessment of institutions in the five Andean countries in 
comparative perspective. Drawing from a data set of over 150 countries, Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido–Lobatón (1999, 2002) of the World Bank provide six governance indicators for each 
Andean country in two years: 1998 and 2001. Using the indices of Kaufman et.al., Table 3 provides 
the values of these indices for Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay, and the average of Latin America 
and OECD countries. These governance indicators are based on qualitative–response surveys taken 
of citizens, investors, users of public services comprise the following dimensions.
25 
•  Voice and Accountability 
•  Political Instability and Violence 
•  Government Effectiveness 
•  Regulatory Quality 
•  Rule of Law 
•  Control of Corruption 
These variables reflect several aspects of “good governance”.
26 Voice and accountability, for 
example, are an important feed–back mechanism between users and providers of public services, or 
between principals (voters) and agents (government, politicians) regarding the compliance with 
public mandates. The existence of political instability and violence are indicative of governance 
problems and are also correlated with poor economic performance.
27 The other variables listed 
above are also identified by the literature as indicators of both qualities of government and of the 
stability of institutions. From a development perspective, there is a growing literature that finds a 
positive correlation between economic performance and quality of government and institutions (see 
Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer, 1995, Barro, (1996) and others). 
Table G3 shows that the Andean group as a whole ranks lower on different governance 
measures (in the sense of lower institutional performance) than the Latin American and Caribbean 
                                                       
24   See Hartlyn (1994) and Coppedge (1994) for analysis of presidentialism in Venezuela.  
25   Studies of the relationship between institutional quality and growth performance are Barro (1996), Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer 
(1995). A useful survey of this literature is Aron (2000). 
26    See La Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) for an interesting discussion of “quality of government”and its 
determinants.  
27   See Serven and Solimano, 1993 and Pyndick and Solimano (1993) for analytical discussion and empirical evidence of the adverse 
effects of (mainly economic) instability on private capital formation, an important determinant of the rate of economic growth. 
Studies of the effects of political instability on growth are Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Barro, (1991), Alesina et.al. (1996). Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
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average. This is clear in the indices of voice and accountability, the degree of political instability 
and violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, and the control of corruption. Their rankings 
are lower when compared with Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the OECD. Within the Andean 
countries there are also cross–country differences in the value of the indices. Bolivia, for example, 
has a level of regulatory burdens that is closer to OECD levels than do the other Andean countries. 
There are, however, some changes in the rankings between 1998 and 2001, such as the way that 
voice and accountability improves in Peru in 2001 compared to in 1998 (this is probably associated 
with greater government accountability after the demise of the Fujimori administration). Voice and 
accountability worsens, however, in Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela between 1998 and 2001. 
Political instability and violence increases (lowering the country’s place in the rankings) in Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Venezuela but improves in Peru. The control of corruption improved in Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela in 2001 compared to 1998. 
World Economic Forum–Harvard University indices 
Another set of governance indices that include the five Andean countries is the Global 
Competitiveness Report prepared jointly by the World Economic Forum and Harvard University. 
This Report computes a "Growth Competitiveness Index" for 75 countries including developed 
nations, transition economies, and developing countries. This index assesses the medium–term 
potential of sustained economic growth for a given country as a function of three sets of sub–
indices: (i) technology index, (ii) quality of public institutions index and (iii) macroeconomic 
environment index. 
The growth competitiveness index
28 for 2000/2001 is calculated for a group of 18 “core 
economies” that includes countries with higher levels of income per capital, and a more advanced 
level of technological capabilities (measured by number of patents per million population). The 
index also includes a group of “non–core economies” of low to intermediate income per–capita 
levels and less advanced technological development. For the group of non–core economies , among 
which we find the Andean group, the index is computed by giving equal weights (1/3) to 
technology, quality of public institutions, and macroeconomic environment sub–indices. In the core 
group, the technology sub–index has a higher share, 40% versus 33%, reflecting the higher 
contribution of technological improvements to output growth in higher per capita income 
economies. 
In order to highlight the links between growth potential and quality of institutions, Table G4 
presents the rankings of the Growth Competitiveness Index, and the public institutions index. This 
later index is composed by a: (i) contracts and law sub–index and a (ii) corruption sub–index. 
These two sub–indices are based entirely on survey questions and measure the average scores given 
to judicial independence, government procurement practices, law enforcement, and costs related to 
organized crime. The corruption sub–index measures the pervasiveness of bribery in three key 
public services areas: import and exports agencies, public utilities, and tax collection. Table G4 
shows that on average, for the five Andean countries there is a close association between their 
ranking in the growth competitiveness index (ranking 63 out of 75 nations) and their ranking in the 
public institutions index (59 out of 75), suggesting a direct positive correlation between medium 
term growth potential and the quality of public institutions. The Andean countries on average 
occupy the 67
th place in the ranking for contracts and law index and the 50
th in the corruption index. 
Cross country differences among Andean countries are not very large except for with the 
corruption index, in which Peru has the best ranking and Ecuador has the worst (in 2000/2001). 
                                                       
28   The Global Competitiveness Report, 2001–2002, World Economic Forum–Center for International Development, Harvard 
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Finally, another aspect of governance lies in citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. Latin 
Barometro, a survey conducted on annual basis in several Latin American countries, provides a 
measure of such public attitudes. Table G5 shows that, on average, the degree of public support for 
democracy has been declining since 1997, with a sharper decline in 2001. In 2001, within the 
Andean group, the country with the lowest public support for democracy is Colombia (30%), a 
country that has suffered severe violence;, the highest degree of support for democracy, on the 
other hand, is found in Peru (62%). The degree of support for the democratic system was also low 
in Ecuador in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is interesting to note that the lower support of 
democracy after 1997 coincides with the post–1997 worsening of economic conditions in these 
countries that was associated with the Asian crisis and other internal economic developments. 
C.  Social inequality and ethnic diversity 
The Andean countries have stratified social structures characterized by high inequality and 
large incidences of poverty. This social situation is bound to affect patterns of social conflict and 
cooperation in society. Another important element of their social structure that is more relevant in 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru is ethnic diversity.
29 In fact, the share of indigenous population in total 
population for Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, in the early 1990s (last census available) is 44 percent 
(see Table G5). In contrast, the average share of indigenous population in Colombia and Venezuela 
is very low, less than 1 percent. Ethnic diversity often comes along with a linguistic and cultural 
variety among different ethnic groups within the same state. Ethnic diversity has some important 
implications for the capacity of the political system to articulate a social consensus. The ability to 
reach consensus depends on a range of factors, such as the levels of political participation of the 
different groups, their rights, their organization, the quality of their leadership and others.  
Returning to the social indicators, Table E6 provides poverty levels, the values of Gini 
coefficients measuring inequality, and the ratio between the top and bottom quintiles in the income 
distribution for selected years in the 1980s and 1990s. These social indicators show a significant 
incidence of poverty in the Andean countries, over 40 percent in recent years (above the average 
poverty levels for Latin America). The highest incidences of poverty are found in Ecuador and 
Bolivia. Moreover, poverty is on the rise in Venezuela, a country that in the past had relatively 
lower poverty rates within the Andean region. The Gini coefficients are higher in Colombia, 
Bolivia and rising in Venezuela, that they are in the other Andean countries, although the Gini 
coefficients are generally high in all five Andean countries. 
D. Economic  performance 
In the second half of the twentieth century (1950–2000), the five Andean countries grew at 
an average rate of 3.9% per year, a bit below the average rate of growth of 4.2% for the whole 
Latin American and Caribbean region in the same period (ECLAC, statistical data base). 
In the 1990s, the economic growth performance in the Andean group was moderate, although 
important economic reforms were undertaken in several of them. Average annual growth for the 
five Andean countries declined from 4% in 1960–1990 to 2.9% in 1990–99 and 2.3% in 2000–
2001. The countries that experienced the largest deceleration in growth rates were Colombia and 
Ecuador (see table E.1).
30 While Ecuador managed to grow at an annual rate of 5.3% in the period 
1960–90, its annual growth rate of the 1990s was only 1.9% per year. Colombia’s average growth 
                                                       
29   An analysis of ethnicity and governance for Latin America and Andean countries is De Gregori (1998) 
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rate decelerated from 4.7% in 1960–90 to 2.9% in 1990–99 and 2.2% in 2000–2001
31. In contrast, 
Bolivia’s growth rate accelerated, albeit moderately, in the 1990s (4 percent per year versus 3.3 
percent in the 1960–90 period).
32 The average per capita income level of the Andean group is 
around U$ 2,000 (year 2001, see table E5), below the average in Latin America of US$ 3,900 for 
the same year. There is no doubt that the modest governance and political instability already 
documented is correlated with this economic growth performance. Although, we will not enter here 
in the transmission mechanisms between governance and growth, the literature has highlighted the 
impact of institutions on private investment and productivity growth. 
 
                                                       
31   See Ocampo (2002) for an analysis of the economic performance of Colombia in recent years. 
32    The individual country story of the evolution of the economy of each Andean countries is told in the country papers of the Political 
Economy of the Andean Region's project. CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo  N°23  
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III. Interpreting Andean countries 
governance performance 
Along with the conceptual framework of section 2 and the 
empirical analysis in section 3, we can highlight three main factors 
that are important to explain governance patterns observed in the 
Andean region: 
A.  Characteristics of the political system. 
B.  Weaknesses of the state. 
C.  The impact of high inequality and the ethnic make–up. 
A.  The political system 
One hypothesis is that at the root of the governance problems of 
the Andean region lies the nature of its political system. An important 
dimension of the political system is the presidential regime that 
governs all the Andean countries. As mentioned before, it is argued 
that presidential systems, with their rigidity of fixed presidential 
terms, their tendency to produce a winner–take–all situation, and their 
dual legitimacy with legislatures and executives, tend to be associated 
with more frequent presidential crises that in some cases can lead to 
"regime breakdowns" that is, the collapse of democracy and the 
disruption of constitutional rule. While this argument has validity, it 
needs to be qualified. All Andean countries have presidential regimes 
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but not all of them have the same high frequency of presidential crises that has been observed in the 
recent histories of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, nor the same record of regime break–downs. With 
respect to regime break–downs, however, the potential fragility of democracy can be a real problem 
for even Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that have avoided the disruption of democratic 
rule in the past four decades. Current polarization between the Chávez administration and the 
opposition is indicative that Venezuela is far from immune to destabilizing pressures on 
democracy. 
Another important indicator of problems in the political system is the relatively high 
frequency of constitutional reforms (higher than other Latin–American and OECD countries) that 
has been observed in several Andean countries during the last century (already documented in 
Section 3). This frequent constitutional reform is indicative of certain instability in the core rules of 
the political game in Andean countries. Regarding the perception of the presidential system, it is 
worth noting that in their last two new constitutions, both Ecuador in 1998 and Venezuela in 1999 
reinforced the authority of the President ("more Presidentialism"). New constitutions addressed 
other issues as well like the indigenous population problem by increasing Indigenous political and 
economic rights. In fact, the Colombian and Ecuadorian more recent constitutions encouraged 
decentralization and a greater access to social services, such as education and health services, to 
excluded groups. The Venezuelan constitution that was approved in 1999, besides strengthening 
the presidency, also had an explicit redistribute objective pursued through an increase in social 
rights and entitlements (see Del Bufalo and Rios (2002)). Also the constitution of 1991 in 
Colombia that expanded the economic entitlements and fostered decentralization led to an 
important increase in public spending as share of GDP in the 1990’s (see Ocampo, 2002). 
Another feature of the political system in some Andean countries is the fragmentation and 
weakening of political parties. Ecuador, for example, has more than 12 political parties; there was 
an attempt to change this situation in the constitution of 1998 by putting a minimum vote 
requirement (5%) to form and legally maintain a political party. A large number of parties in 
Ecuador, some reflecting strong regional interests, makes it difficult to reach a parliamentary 
consensus and, in other instances, fractionalizes national politics (see Arteta and Hurtado, 2002). In 
contrast, in Colombia and Venezuela the political systems have traditionally gravitated around two 
large parties: liberals and conservatives in Colombia and Acción Democrática (ADECO) and   
Comité de Organizacion Política Electroral Independiente (COPEI) in Venezuela––although in 
recent years even these parties have been severely weakened. In Colombia, internal factions 
undermine the strength of the conservative and liberal umbrella groups. In Venezuela, the Chávez 
administration presided over the virtual disintegration of ADECO and COPEI that left a political 
vacuum in the place of strong parties or movements. In Peru, the traditional Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) party suffered a considerable loss of influence in the early 
1990s after the government of Alan García in the late 1980s (García made a strong return a decade 
later in the presidential election of 2001). 
B.  The weak State hypothesis. 
The State must be able to provide public goods such as law and order, infrastructure, contract 
enforcement, control of the territory. A “weak State" is one that fails to provide the required 
amounts of these public goods with the consequence that individual security becomes precarious, 
that the rule of law is partial and incomplete, and that respect for civil rights and property rights is 
limited. Physical and institutional infrastructures, in turn, become weak and economic prosperity 
fails to develop.  CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo  N°23  
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Colombia is an interesting case in this regard. On one hand, it has high levels of violence 
(political and criminal), an ongoing internal conflict that has lasted for more than four decades, and 
an important illegal drug industry. On the other hand, Colombia in the last 40 years has maintained 
normal and regular elections, presidents complete their constitutional terms, and democratic 
institutions operate with apparent normalcy. The State is “weak” in some governance dimensions 
e.g. lack of maintenance of law and order in the whole territory, but relatively "strong" in others 
(elections are maintained regularly, civil freedoms are preserved).  
Our empirical analysis of quality of institutions based on surveys–indices suggest several 
problems of governance and institutional weaknesses already discussed that fit in the description of 
a weak State; although the concept has its nuances that are important to keep in mind.  
C.  Social inequality and ethnic structure 
A third hypothesis that helps explain the governance problems of the Andean nations is their 
high levels of income and wealth inequality and, in three out of five countries, their significant 
ethnic diversity. During the first 3 to 4 decades of the twentieth century, these countries were 
predominantly rural societies with a concentrated structure of land ownership and a wide income 
differential between land–owners, small land holders and peasants. Inequality was predominantly a 
rural phenomenon associated largely with the prevailing land tenure patterns.
33 Following the 
development of local manufacturing, the expansion of the state sector, and the adoption of import 
substitution policies, rural–urban migration took on a greater intensity around the mid twentieth 
and a middle class formed (varying across countries in size and importance) that helped to stabilize 
societies. In this new setting, social inequalities remained, but revolved around the ownership of 
productive capital, access to credit, access to educational opportunities, and access to political 
decision–making. As mentioned before, various strands of social theory, including recent 
endogenous growth models, predict that countries with high inequality tend to have higher levels of 
social conflict, polarization, and political instability than more egalitarian countries.
34 
To income and wealth inequality, we must add the significant ethnic diversity in Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru. As Table G4 shows, between 34 and 59 percent of the population in all three 
countries is indigenous. Gray Molina and Chávez (2002) show that only 58 percent of the 
population of Bolivia speaks Spanish , followed by Quechua, (22.9 percent), Aymara (15.7 percent) 
and other languages.
35 In Bolivia, the pattern of indigenous population participation in national 
civic life went from exclusion and marginalization to active demands of ethnic rights and 
nationalistic claims such as Aymara Nationalism. The presidential candidates that were supported 
by several indigenous groups also obtained a high number of votes in the recent presidential 
election. The indigenous movement also became an important political actor in Ecuador in 1998 
and 1999, during the Mahuad administration. The CONAIE, the largest Ecuadorian confederation 
of indigenous people, organized several mass protests in 1999, culminating in January of 2000 with 
an indigenous uprising that was joined by colonels of the army and that eventually led to the 
ousting of President Mahuad. The main point here is that indigenous groups have become an 
important political force in some Andean countries. These indigenous movements demand 
economic and civic rights and entertain, at times, a nationalistic agenda. 
 
 
                                                       
33   See Thorpe, Rosemary (2000) 
34   See Solimano (1998), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
35   According to the last published national population census of population (1992). Governance crises and the Andean region: a political economy analysis 
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IV. Concluding remarks 
The Andean countries, which form a region with an abundance 
of natural resources and other valuable assets, exhibit a variety of 
governance problems that hinder their potential for social peace, 
stability, and economic prosperity. Their governance records, past and 
present, vary from country to country but have generally been 
characterized by political instability, frequent constitutional reforms, 
presidential crises, volatility of democratic institutions, and violence. 
The empirical evidence of the quality of institutions puts the Andean 
region in a low place in international rankings of (survey–based) 
indices of voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory burden, 
control of corruption, political instability, and violence, although 
improvements in some of these governance dimensions have also been 
observed.  
This paper highlights the way that governance problems can be 
decomposed at three levels: the political–constitutional regime, the 
working of intermediate level institutions, and the patterns of social 
conflict, inequality and ethnic diversity. Important features of the 
political regime in Andean countries need further scrutiny for any 
broad agenda of institutional reform. These features comprise the 
scope and limits of presidential regimes to handle political crises, the 
workings of the party system and other constitutional provisions. At 
the level of intermediate institutions, complex principal–agents 
problems combine with the chronic problems of rent seeking, 
corruption, and violence that governments have tried to tackle but 
continue to severely hinder institutional effectiveness. Organizational 
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principles of goal–clarity, adequate resources, and freedom from undue political interference must 
be reinforced. Income and wealth inequality, although not new phenomena in the Andean region or 
in Latin America, need to be addressed as high inequality is often correlated with social conflict, 
political polarization, and slow economic growth. Although radical redistribution of existing assets 
can be destabilizing and can slow growth, policies that foster a more egalitarian access to capital, 
credit, education, and political representation can have good medium–term pay–offs in terms of 
enhanced stability and more rapid economic growth. Ethnic diversity is another important social 
feature in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru that needs to be addressed through creative 
political and economic reforms with an ethnically–inclusive component. This analysis suggests that 
for the Andean region to realize its economic potential, it must adequately tackle its complex 
political and institutional problems. 
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Table G1 





1900 – 2000 
Presidential Crisis 1950–2002
[b]   Number of 
presidential 






 Countries  Year 
Number of 
constitutional 
reforms in the 
20th century 
Crisis Year and President  Presidential period 
until crises 
     
Bolivia 1938     1951(Mamerto Urriolagoitia)  1949–1951     Democracy 
     1945  5  1952 (Gral. Hugo Ballivián)  1951–1952  16  Authoritarian, military 
     1960     1964 (Víctor Paz)  1960–1964     Democracy 
     1967     1969 (Gral. René Barrientos) 
[c]  1966–1969     Authoritarian, military 
     1994     1969 (Luis Siles)  1969     Authoritarian, civilian 
           1970 (Gral. Alfredo Ovando)  1969–1970     Authoritarian, military 
           1971 (Gral. Juan José Torres)  1970–1971     Authoritarian, military 
           1978 (Gral. Juan Pereda)  1978     Authoritarian, military 
           1979 (Walter Guevara)  1979     Democracy 
           1979 (Gral. Alberto Natusch)  1979     Authoritarian, military 
           1980 (Lidia Gueilier)  1979–1980     Democracy 
           1981 (Gral. Luis García)  1980–1981     Authoritarian, military 
           1982 (Gral. Celso Torrelio)  1981–1982     Authoritarian, military 
           1982 (Gral. Guido Vildoso)  1982     Authoritarian, military 
           1985 (Hernán Siles)  1982–1985     Democracy 
         2001(Hugo Banzer) 
[d]  1997–2002     Democracy 
Colombia 1991  1  1953 (Laureano Gómez)  1953  2  Democracy 
         1957 (Gustavo Rojas)  1953–1958     Authoritarian, military 
Ecuador 1929     1961 (José María Velasco)  1960–1961     Democracy 
     1938  7  1963 (Carlos Arosemena)  1961–1963  10  Democracy 
     1945     1970 (José María Velasco) 
[e]  1968–1970     Democracy 
     1946     1972 (José María Velasco)  1970–1972     Authoritarian, civilian 
     1967   1976 (Gral. Guillermo Rodriguez)  1972–1976     Authoritarian, military 
     1979     1981 (Jaime Roldás) 
[e]  1979–1981     Democracy 
     1998    1997 (Abdalá Bucaram)  1996–1997     Democracy 
           1997 (Rosalía Arteaga)  1997     Democracy 
           2000 (Jamil Mahuad)  1998–2000     Democracy 
           
2000 (Solórzeno, Mendoza, 
Vargas)  2000     Democracy 
Peru 1920     1962 (Manuel Prado)  1956–1962     Democracy 
     1933  4  1963 (Ricardo Pérez)  1962–1963  6  Authoritarian, military 
     1979     1968 (Fernando Belaude)  1963–1968     Democracy 
     1993    1975 (Juan Velasco)  1968–1975     Authoritarian, military 
          1992 (Alberto Fujimori) 
[e]  1990–1992     Democracy 
            2000 (Alberto Fujimori)  1995–2000     Democracy 
Venezuela 1901     1950 (Carlos Delgado)
 [d]  1948–1950     Authoritarian, military 
     1909  8  1958 (Marcos Pérez)  1952–1958  4  Authoritarian, military 
     1931     1993 (Carlos Andrés Pérez)  1989–1993     Democracy 
     1945     2002 (Hugo Chávez
) [f]  1999–     Democracy 
     1947                        
     1953                        
     1961                       
   1999                            
Source:  http://geocities.yahoo.com.br/escritoriorbm/historia/index_b.html, 
http://es.geocities.com/datalia2002/colombia.htm, http://www.explored.com.ec/ecuador/1960.htm, 
http://www.tierra–inca.com/presidents/index_es.html, http://www.aldeaeducativa.com 
[a] New constitution approved. 
[b] Presidents that did not complete their constitutional periods by coups,  
     resignation and non–voluntary removals. 
[c] Death of the President  
[d] By illness of the President 
[e] Self–Coup 
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TABLE G2 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS AND TURNOVER OF PRIME– MINISTER, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Countries Number  of  Presidential 
[b]  Number of  Prevailing 
   Constitutions 
[a]  Crisis presidential  Political  Regime 
     1900–2000 1950  – 2002  Crisis  Before 
     Year  Number of  Crisis Year   Presidential  in the  Presidential 
        constitutional  and President  Period Until  period  Crisis 
        reforms         Crisis  1950–2002    
        in the 20th                     
      century                         
Chile 1925  2  1973 (Salvador Allende)  1970–1973  1  Democracy 
      1980                      
Costa Rica  1949  1                 0       
Uruguay 1918     1976 (Juan M. Bordaberry)  1972–1976     Democracy 
     1934  5  1976 (Alberto Demichelli)  1976  2  Authoritarian, civilian 
     1942                           
     1952                           
      1967                            
USA     0  1963 (John F. Kennedy)  1961–1963  2  Democracy 
            1974 (Richard Nixon)  1969–1974     Democracy 
                      Turnover      
PARLIAMENTARY                    of      
REGIMES                    Prime–      
                         Minister      
                         1950–2002      
Germany 1919  2                 5  Democracy 
      1949                           
Italy 1948  1                 58  Democracy 
United Kingdom     0                 12  Democracy 






[a] New constitution approved. 
[b] Presidents that did not complete their constitutional periods by coups,  
     resignation and non–voluntary removals. 




RANKING OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR THE ANDEAN GROUP 
(World Bank)  
      Voice and  Political  Government  Regulatory  Rule  Control of  
Countries Accountability  Instability  Effectiveness  Quality  of  Law  Corruption 
          and Violence                      
Number  of  Countries 170  173 152 161 153 159 163 168 167 169 152 160 
     1998  2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 1998 2001 
                                     
Bolivia    63  67  87 122 83 101 22  39  97 100 95 119 
Colombia   91  112 140 149 74  95  69  93 128  132 102 89 
Ecuador    66  92  108 131 110 129  61  95  121 130 123 140 
Peru    124  70 111 95  54  93  37  61 110  109 73  72 
Venezuela  68  106  92  100 131 124  91  115 117 136 114 107 
Andean  Countries  82  89 108  119 90 108 56  81 115  121  101  105 
Top Latin America                                     
Chile    54  52 51 30 23 23 18 13 24 24 25 17 
Costa  Rica    21  16 30 24 42 37 16 26 48 50 37 32 
Uruguay   46  32 58 25 37 44 13 22 61 48 45 37 
Latin  America  83 81 83 91 92 83 79 61  105  101  91 89 
OECD      24  23 28 26 24 25 28 29 27 27 25 23 
Source: Kaufmann D., Kraay A., and Zoido–Lobatón P.(1999–2002). "Governance Matters", Policy Research 
Working Paper 2196 and "Governance Matters", Policy Research Working Paper 2772, World Bank. 
 
Table G4 
COMPETITIVENESS AND GOVERNANCE INDICATORS RANKINGS ANDEAN GROUP, 2001–2002 
(World Economic Forum–Harvard University) 














Countries              
Number of Countries  75  75  75  75 
Peru   55  45  60  30 
Venezuela   62  65  71  61 
Colombia   65  57  67  40 
Bolivia   67  62  62  56 
Ecuador     68  68  73  63 
Andean Countries  63  59  67  50 
Top Latin America             
Chile   27  21  26  13 
Costa Rica    35  37  35  43 
Uruguay   46  31  27  38 
Latin America  56  55  57  51 
OECD     20 21  21  23 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2001, World Economic Forum, 
and Harvard University. 
Note: Growth competitiveness Index = 1/3 technology index + 1/3 public institutions 
index + 1/3 macro–economic environment index. Public Institutions Index = 1/2 
contracts and law subindex + 1/2 corruption subindex. The rank is of 75 countries. 
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Table G5 
DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE TO ANY OTHER POLITICAL REGIME 
(percent of public support) 
Countries  1996 1997  1998 2000 2001 
Bolivia  64 66  55 62 54 
Colombia  60 69  55 50 36 
Ecuador  52 41  57 54 40 
Peru    63 60  63 64 62 
Venezuela  62 64  60 61 57 
Andean  Group  60.2 60.0  58.0 58.2 49.8 





INDIGENOUS POPULATION IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 
Countries Year Total  Indigenous  % 
     Population  Population     
Bolivia 1992  5 183 403  3 058 208  59.0 
Colombia 1985  29 719 875  237 759  0.8 
Ecuador 1992  11 078 717  3 800 000  34.3 
Peru* 1992  22 500 000  9 000 000  40.0 
Venezuela 1992  34 974 667  314 772  0.9 





ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1950–2001 
(annual rate of change, %) 
Countries 1950–00 1950–90 1990–95 1995–99 1990–99 2000–01
(a) 
Bolivia  2.5 2.5 4.2 3.9 4.0 1.2 
Colombia  3.7 3.7 4.5 1.4 2.9 2.2 
Ecuador  4.2 4.2 3.4 0.2 1.9 3.7 
Peru  2.2 2.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 1.3 
Venezuela  2.3 2.3 4.0 0.9 2.4 3.0 
Andean  Group 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.9 2.3 
Latin  America  4.2 4.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.3 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(a) 2001 Preliminary estimates. 
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TABLE E2 
RATE OF INFLATION IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1980–2001 
(annual rate of change, %) 
Countries     1980–89 1990–95 1995–99 1990–99 2000  2001
(a) 
Bolivia 9.6  11.9  6.9  9.6  3.4  1.1 
Colombia 10.6  24.8  16.9  21.4  8.8  7.8 
Ecuador 29.1  39.6  36.7  39.8  90.7  24.6 
Peru 880.3  1318.0  7.7  793.6  3.7  0.1 
Venezuela 42.8  45.5  49.5  46.4  13.4  12.7 
Andean Group  194.5  287.96  23.54  182.15  24.0  9.3 
Latin America  388.4  509.75  14.84  310.69  9.3  7.0 
Source: Economic Commission For Latin America And The Caribbean. 




CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1970–2001 
(% of GDP) 
Countries     1970–89 1990–95 1995–99 1990–99 2000  2001
(a) 
Bolivia  –5.9  –6.0  –6.2  –6.2  –7.0  –4.4 
Colombia  –2.0  –0.9  –4.1  –2.1  –0.2  –2.5 
Ecuador  –5.2  –3.9  –2.2  –3.0 10.7 –5.8 
Peru  –3.4  –5.8  –5.8  –5.6  –3.0 2.0 
Venezuela  1.3 3.0 3.9 3.4  12.0  4.1 
Andean Group  –3.0  –2.7  –2.9  –2.7 2.5 –1.3 
Latin America  –2.4  –2.2  –3.1  –2.6  –2.5  –2.6 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 




FISCAL DEFICIT IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1980–2001 
(% of GDP) 
Countries     1980–89 1990–95 1995–99 1990–99 2000  2001
(a) 
Bolivia  –10.2    –4.0  –3.0  –3.7  –4.1  –4.0 
Colombia  –3.7    0.0  –2.8  –1.4  –4.1  –3.3 
Ecuador  –5.1  –0.5  –3.6  –1.9    0.4    0.3 
Peru  –4.4  –3.2  –2.0  –2.6  –2.5  –2.4 
Venezuela  –2.3  –3.6  –1.7  –2.6  –1.7  –3.5 
Andean Group  –5.1  –2.3  –2.6  –2.4  –2.4  –2.6 
Latin America and
Caribbean   ––––––––  –1.4  –2.0  –1.7  –2.7  –3.1 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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TABLE E5 
GDP PER CAPITA IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1970–2001 
(dollars at 1995 prices/number of persons) 
Countries     1970–89 1990–95 1995–99 1990–99 2000  2001
(a) 
Bolivia 934.0  868.0  940.6  900.5  955.6  930.0 
Colombia 1  815.5  2 229.9  2 382.6  2 289.2  2 285.8  2 275.8 
Ecuador 1  367.4  1 530.1  1 538.4  1 530.7  1 424.1  1 460.7 
Peru 2  734.3  2 199.5  2 579.4  2 351.4  2 601.3  2 190.3 
Venezuela 3  523.0  3 258.8  3 179.6  3 227.1  3 026.4  3 123.6 
Andean Group  2 074.8  2 017.2  2 124.1  2 059.8  2 058.6  1 996.1 
Latin America  3 325.2  3 455.0  3 708.7  3 570.1  3 856.9  3 934.4 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and CELADE 




POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES 1990–1997 
Countries  % households below  Gini  Ratio 
      the poverty line  coefficient  Q5/Q1 
Bolivia (a)   1989  49 0.484  0.062 
   1994  46 0.435  0.104 
   1997  47 0.455  0.088 
Colombia  1980  39 0.518  0.058 
   1991  50 0.403  0.117 
   1994  47 0.505  0.104 
   1997  45 0.477  0.088 
Ecuador (a)   1990  56 0.381  0.128 
   1994  52 0.397  0.108 
   1997  50 0.388  0.125 
Perú  1979  46       
   1986  52       
   1990        0.438 
(a)    
   1991        0.370 
(a)    
   1994        0.350 
(a)    
   1995  41       
   1997  37       
Venezuela  1981  22 0.306  0.184 
   1990  34 0.378  0.127 
   1994  42 0.387  0.132 
   1997  42 0.425  0.101 
Latin America  1980  35       
   1990 41       
   1994 38       
   1997 36       
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and The 
World Bank. 
(a) Zonas Urbanas 
Q5/Q1 = Ratio of the poverst quintile to the richest quintile. 
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